China’s suspicions about India’s intentions with regard
to Tibet in the 1950s, unfounded or otherwise, were not Beijing’s only
major consideration in the lead-up to 1962. Declassified internal
Chinese documents detail how the Forward Policy, by the summer of 1962,
began to be seen in Beijing as an attempt by Nehru to unilaterally grab
territory that had to be firmly stopped. The changing dynamics between
China, India and the Soviet Union emerged as another factor in Mao
Zedong’s decision-making. Nevertheless, Chinese internal communications
from the time establish that the Tibetan issue emerged as perhaps the
most significant driving force behind China’s decision to launch an
offensive against India on October 20, 1962.
Following
the March 10, 1959 uprising in Tibet and the Dalai Lama heading to
India in exile, Chinese officials began to be alarmed by the political
climate in India. In an internal diplomatic note sent to Beijing,
Chinese officials quoted a leader of an Indian Opposition party as
describing the relationship between India and Tibet as “like between a
mother and her child.” “When the son is being attacked, can his mother
be a silent passer-by?” the leader was quoted as saying. “Tibet’s issues
are issues that affect India’s flesh and blood, and it would be wrong
to view Tibet’s issues as China’s internal affairs.”
On
March 25, 1959, Mao convened a meeting of top leaders to discuss the
situation in Tibet, during which he blamed India for the unrest,
declaring that China would not “condemn” India openly but would instead
give India “enough rope to hang itself.” Outwardly, Chinese leaders
continued to affirm “good relations” with India. The Foreign Ministry,
in a note to the Indian government on March 29, said it “welcomed” a
statement made by Nehru “of not interfering in China’s internal
affairs.” “China has never interfered in India’s internal affairs, never
discussed India’s internal affairs in its National People’s Congress or
its Standing Committee, and thinks that it is impolite and improper to
discuss the internal affairs of a friendly country,” the note said.
According to an internal note dated March 30, the Communist Party directed the People’s Daily newspaper
to publish a “friendly observer comment” on April 15, declaring that
“Sino-Indian friendly relations shall not be harmed” by the Tibetan
problem. While the commentary pointed out that “it had been a public
secret that Tibetan rebels had established a foreign base in Kalimpong
and colluded with Imperialists to plan a rebellion,” it added that
“those who dislike Sino-Indian friendliness are attempting to take the
opportunity of the Dalai Lama being in India to incite Tibetans.”
Indian ‘expansionism’
Privately,
however, Mao became increasingly convinced of Indian “expansionist”
designs on Tibet. Mao appeared to have little evidence to back this
conviction — instead, he increasingly began to deflect the
responsibility for the unrest in Tibet, sourced in the colossal failures
of the Communist Party’s reforms, on to India. On April 19, he directed
the Xinhua news agency to issue a commentary which he personally
revised, as John W. Garver notes in his essay “China’s Decision for War
with India in 1962.” The commentary, which finally appeared on May 6,
1959, accused Nehru of encouraging the rebels in India, arguing that
Nehru and the “bourgeoisie” in India had sought to maintain Tibet as a
buffer and restore its semi-independent status. Mao’s suspicions were
fed by internal notes from Lhasa. A January 15, 1960 note from the
Foreign Affairs Office in Lhasa in great detail reported of Indian
“expansionist” activities in Kalimpong. “The Indian expansionists cannot
be reconciled to their failure, and have not given up their conspiracy
on Tibet,” the note said. “They have a set of practices such as..
maintaining reserve forces. If the Indian expansionists lose their
relationship with these Tibetan serf-owners, all of their plans will
have no way out. Therefore, they try every possible way…”
In
April 1961, the Foreign Affairs Office in Tibet in another memo said
India’s attitude on Tibet had gotten “worse” in the two years after the
uprising. The note explicitly linked Tibet to the boundary dispute, and
put forward suggestions for revising the 1954 agreement on Tibet. “The
present Tibet has been radically changed when compared with that in
1954,” the note said. “The Indian attitude is worse; it was friendly to
China then and now India opposes China…. The Sino-Indian border issue…is
the pretext India uses to oppose China and has become an essential
issue for present Sino-Indian relations.”
Chinese
suspicions that linked Tibet and the border continued to heighten
towards the end of 1961, when the Forward Policy began to be
implemented. By then, Zhou Enlai’s 1960 visit to New Delhi had ended in
stalemate. The deadlock was further reinforced by India’s demand for the
Chinese to withdraw from the Aksai Chin region before any talks could
be held. Nehru’s demand further stoked Chinese suspicions. “Nehru’s
insistence on Chinese abandonment of Aksai Chin established a link in
Chinese minds between the border issue and China’s ability to control
Tibet,” Garver writes in his essay, as the road connecting Xinjiang and
Tibet was crucial to China sustaining military posts. Garver concluded
that “very probably the powerful but inaccurate Chinese belief about
India’s desire to ‘seize Tibet’ led to an incorrect Chinese conclusion
that Nehru’s insistence on Aksai Chin was part of a grand plan to
achieve that purpose.”
East west swap
China’s
concerns on its sovereignty in Tibet continue to cast a shadow on the
boundary dispute. As Garver notes in his seminal work “Protracted
Contest,” China twice proposed — or at least, hinted at — an “east west
swap” to resolve the boundary dispute. The swap involved China giving up
its claims to Tawang, in Arunachal Pradesh, whose geography is crucial
to India’s defence of the northeast. India would, in turn, give up its
claim to Aksai Chin, which provides the People’s Liberation Army the
most crucial land link between Xinjiang and Tibet. The first hint was
during Zhou Enlai’s 1960 visit, and the second suggested by Deng
Xiaoping in 1980. India rejected the swap offer — for Nehru, giving up
Aksai Chin in the political climate of the time appeared politically
untenable.
When the sixth round of border talks
between India and China began in late 1985, as Garver notes, China for
the first time pressed its claims in the eastern sector on Tawang, south
of the McMahon Line. “The Indian side was stunned,” Garver writes.
“They had assumed that China implicitly accepted that line…” While the
current status and progress on the boundary talks is unclear given the
secrecy it is shrouded in, China has appeared to hold on to this
position since. One Chinese scholar, who did not want to be identified
citing the sensitivity of the issue, said from Beijing’s point of view,
Tawang was now the central question at the heart of the boundary
dispute. As long as China fails to arrive at any kind of resolution with
the Dalai Lama and remains concerned about stability in Tibet, China is
unlikely to entertain the thought of giving up all its claims on
Tawang, the scholar suggested.
With increasingly
frequent invocations of China’s claim on Arunachal Pradesh as “south
Tibet” in State media outlets since the 2000s and harsh denunciations of
the Dalai Lama, the Communist Party, the scholar added, would perhaps
even find it difficult to sell a settlement that involved conceding its
claims in the eastern sector, particularly against the rising tide of
nationalism and criticisms of a “weak government” evident during recent
anti-Japan protests. The history of Chinese suspicions on India’s
intentions on Tibet, even if unfounded, remains hugely relevant to the
boundary question even five decades later.
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